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Is Gettier’s First Example Flawed?  
Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Konstanz 
1. Introduction: what does Smith believe?   
1.1. The 'Gettier counterexamples' (Gettier 19631) to the 
tripartite account of propositional knowledge are generally 
taken to show that not every instance of justified true belief 
constitutes knowledge. I argue that Gettier's famous first 
example fails to establish this conclusion. I claim to show 
that the example violates the belief condition of the 
tripartite account. Of course, if Smith does not believe that  
(1) the man who will get the job has ten coins in his 
pocket  
it should not be surprising that he does not know it either, 
as Gettier correctly claims. But as the three conditions are 
not satisfied, the tripartite account is not refuted.  
1.2. My analysis exploits the distinction between 'attribu-
tive' and 'referential' uses of a definite description 
introduced by Donnellan (Donnellan 1966). According to 
Donnellan, 'the F' in a statement of the form 'the F is G' 
(here: (1) 'the man who will get the job has ten coins in his 
pocket') can be used attributively in order to attribute the 
property of G-hood to whatever object satisfies the 
description (is the F); or referentially, serving as one 
contextually adequate way of establishing reference to an 
independently identified object with the intention of making 
an assertion about that object, namely, that it is G. I 
consequently take beliefs involving descriptions to have 
the following truth conditions: if the description is intended 
referentially, the belief is singular, and the object referred 
to figures in it as 'constituent'. It is true iff this object is G. 
Understood attributively, as in Russell's original account, it 
has to be analysed as an existential statement (i.e. as: ∃x 
(Fx & ∀y (Fy Æ y=x) & Gx)), and that is true iff there exists 
some object that is both the unique F and also G. This 
object, however, does not enter the truth conditions of the 
thought that would also be true if in its stead some other 
object had been both the unique F, and G.  
Now, to know (or believe) that the F is G, as a referential 
proposition, is to know (believe) of the object that actually 
is the F that it is G. To know (believe) an attributive 
proposition instead is to know (believe) that there exists 
some object – the identity of which one need not (but may 
have) an opinion about – such that this object is both the 
unique F and G. Both of these cases can properly be 
reported as 'knowing that the F is G'.  
1.3. The Gettier example to which I would now like to 
apply this distinction is the following: Smith is justified in 
believing that Jones will get the job they have both applied 
for, and he also has a justified and true belief that Jones 
has ten coins in his pocket. So apparently Smith's belief in 
the following would be justified: 
(1)  The man who will get the job has ten coins in his 
pocket. 
But should, unexpectedly, Smith himself get the job, and 
should he himself coincidentally and unbeknownst to him 
have ten coins in his pocket too, (1) is true, even though 
one proposition from which it had initially been deduced is 
false. 
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 All unannotated quotations are from the first example of this paper.  
Now apparently i) (1) is true, ii) Smith believes it, and iii) 
Smith is justified in believing it.2 The three conditions for 
knowledge as justified true belief seem satisfied. Yet, 
Gettier continues, certainly this is not an instance of 
knowledge since Smith's belief "is true in virtue of the coins 
in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many 
coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in [(1)] on 
a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely 
believes to be the man who will get the job."  
My methodological Leitmotiv is the question what exactly 
it is that Smith believes but does not know. Given 
Donnellan’s distinction, (1) could represent several distinct 
referential or even an attributive belief. Which one of these 
does Smith believe? I shall argue that he believes none of 
them.  
2. The referential reading: he can’t believe it 
Let us first look at the referential reading. Following 
Donnellan, 'the man who will get the job' could, in this 
context, be used either to refer to Smith, to whom it 
applies, or to Jones, to whom it does not apply; only the 
former reading is interesting here. Yet we are told that 
Smith has been informed that Jones is the person to whom 
the description applies, and that Smith neither believes 
that he himself will get the job, nor that he has ten coins in 
his pocket.  
So, maybe quite obviously, Smith can’t believe (1) if 
understood referentially to him.  
3. The attributive reading: if only he had 
believed!  
3.1. This section is based on the intuition that Smith does 
not have to believe/know that he will get the job for him to 
be able to believe/know that the man who will get the job 
has ten coins in his pocket, even if that should turn out to 
be him; for instance in case he had the ‘attributive’ belief 
(Russell 1905) that whoever will get the job has ten coins 
in his pocket:  
(2) ∃x (x will get the job & ∀y (y will get the job Æ x = y)  
           & x has ten coins in his pocket)
 3 
If so, Smith’s ignorance of the fact that he will get the job 
clearly does not provide sufficient explanation for his 
ignorance of (1): if Smith could believe or know (2) without 
believing that he will get the job, then, logically, the fact 
that he does not believe that he will get the job is not 
conclusive evidence for his not knowing (2). (2), however, 
is just one way of reading (1) and thus Smith could know 
(1) despite this ignorance. But we said that Smith does not 
know (1).  
                                                     
2
 The 'Principle of Deducibility of Justification' (PDJ) asserts that "for any 
proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q 
from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in 
believing Q." My argument does not need to question this principle. Deductive 
closure of beliefs is not required by the tripartite account. 
3 
Another example would be the candidate with the most votes (the actual 
person), who does not have to believe/know that she herself is the candidate 
with the most votes in order to know that the candidate with the most votes 
wins the election. 
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3.2. That Smith has an additional and mistaken belief 
about who will get the job is irrelevant for this attributive 
belief; and accordingly the answer to: 'of whom was Smith 
thinking in believing (2)?' would have had to be: 'of no-one 
in particular' – existential statements, in the logical sense, 
never refer to any object. Most people however would add, 
hesitantly, that Smith does have Jones 'in the back of his 
mind' in some sense. This tends to push us back to the 
referential reading in which the description refers to Jones. 
But Smith's ignorance about who gets the job would only 
have mattered had (1) been intended, first, referentially 
rather than attributively, and secondly, referentially to 
Smith – but Smith certainly doesn’tt have either of these 
referential beliefs (cf. §2).  
So it seems Smith does not have the referential belief, 
and assuming he has the attributive belief his ignorance of 
who gets the job would not have mattered for knowledge 
of (1). What is more, Gettier’s story seems to suggest he 
has both a referential belief and an attributive belief, in 
some sense or other. What, finally, is the role of the coins?  
4. But he couldn’t have believed it!  
4.1. In fact, a conclusive reason why Smith does not seem 
to hold an existential belief like (2) is that he does not 
know about the coins in his pocket. It seems that in order 
for him to believe that whoever will get the job has ten 
coins in his pocket, knowledge of the coins is required 
since, logically, either of Smith or Jones could get the job.  
The central – and so far unjustified – claim here is that 
unless Smith believes of himself that he has ten coins in 
his pocket he cannot plausibly be understood to believe 
that whoever will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, 
given that he is well aware of the fact that he could get the 
job.  
A justification of this claim will have to wait for the next 
section, but the underlying intuition is this. If you claim to 
believe something of some unspecified element of a set of 
things (but of no element in particular, i.e. 'attributively'), 
then, unless you think that what you know serves to 
determine this element (the coins serving to determine 
who will get the job), you will have to believe of all the 
elements whatever what you claim to believe of this 
unspecified element for your claimed belief to hold up as 
belief (rather than just as a claimed belief, that is, a belief 
that you claim to have but do not actually have
4
). My 
argument here may be taken to mirror Gettier's (implicit) 
reasoning for his claim that Smith does not know (1) – just 
replace know for believe in what follows to get Gettier's 
version: in order to believe (2), that is, that whoever will get 
the job has ten coins in his pocket, Smith has to believe 
that whoever could get the job has ten coins in his pocket. 
Both Jones and Smith could get the job, but Smith only 
knows of Jones that he has ten coins in his pocket, thus, 
Smith does not believe of whoever could get the job that 
he has ten coins in his pocket. It follows that he does not 
believe that whoever will get the job has ten coins in his 
pocket – he could not, since for that he would have to 
believe it of himself as well. Hence he does not believe 
that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his 
pocket, whoever that may be. 
4.1. So, that Smith does not know about the coins in his 
pocket is not the reason why he does not know (2) even 
though he does justifiably and truly believe it – as Gettier 
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 This is not as unusual as it might appear. For instance, think of the number 
of people who, on one occasion or other, claim that they believe in God.  
claims – no, it is the reason why he cannot even believe 
(2). The right explanation, then, of why Smith does not 
know (1) is not to be found in the insufficiency of the 
tripartite account of knowledge, it is simply that he does 
not even believe it – but belief is required for knowledge. In 
other words, what is wrong with (1) is that it cannot be read 
as a (justified) true belief of Smith, not that it cannot be 
read as knowledge – but that follows immediately.  
5. The claim justified  
5.1. I will now argue that if Smith were not thus required to 
know about the coins to believe (1), then he could also 
have known it – but we concurred with Gettier that Smith 
does not know. Hence he must be required to know about 
the coins, in this sense, even by Gettier.  
For the purpose of this ‘reductio’ argument let us as-
sume that it were not required that Smith had to know of 
the coins in his pocket to have the belief (2). And it seems 
indeed that this is possible: without believing of himself 
that he has ten coins in his pocket it generally is still 
possible for Smith to believe that the man who will get the 
job has ten coins in his pocket (in the attributive sense) 
even if that should turn out to be him. For instance, he 
learns that the numerologists-board members want to pick 
the person with ten coins in his pocket.  
In such a case Smith could believe (1) attributively 
despite ignorance of the coins in his pocket (as long as he 
is ignorant about who actually gets the job). But here is the 
rub: under these circumstances, one is not barred from 
saying quite literally: 'Smith knew that the man who will get 
the job has ten coins in his pocket', maybe but not even 
necessarily continuing with 'he just did not know that that 
man would be him', and/or with 'he just did not know that 
he had ten coins in his pocket' and thus to attribute 
knowledge of (1) to Smith. That is to say, by not requiring 
that Smith has to be aware of the coins in his pocket it is 
actually possible to attribute belief and knowledge of (1) to 
Smith. (Of course additional knowledge of the coins in his 
pocket would not turn that piece of knowledge into 
ignorance either.)  
5.2. So, in addition to the irrelevance of the ignorance 
about who gets the job, whether Smith knows about the 
coins in his pocket or not really does not matter for the 
attributive belief either – provided Smith actually believes 
(2) as here we assume he does. But the problem for 
Gettier’s story is that clearly Gettier does not want to 
attribute knowledge to Smith! If we assume the above 
claim (cf. §4) to be false, there is no ignorance, but Gettier 
obviously requires this ignorance. Hence it must be true.  
5.3. Note, importantly, that if you accept that ignorance 
of the coins does not show that Smith necessarily does not 
know (2), nor that knowledge of them implies knowledge of 
(2), as surely you have to, then it can no longer simply be 
stipulated that Smith does believe (2) and would know (1) 
in case he knew about the coins. Independent argument is 
now required to establish that Smith does believe (2) in the 
first place since we know that ignorance of the coins in his 
pocket does not suffice to show that he does not know (2) 
if he did believe (2), as Gettier wants us to believe. 
(Ignorance about who will get the job does not matter 
anyway since the belief is attributive). We need a good 
reason to think that in this case, ignorance about the coins 
in his pocket suffices to establish that Smith does not know 
– as we all want to say – since it does not do so generally 
(given belief in (2)). My analysis provides this reason, 
whereas Gettier's story provides none.  
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6. How the Example Works  
6.1. Supposing that Russell's theory of descriptions has 
not entered the subconscious of most readers of this 
example the description in Smith's alleged belief (1) will 
initially be understood as applying 'referentially' to either 
Jones or Smith. The reader is thus faced with two possible 
readings of (1) representable as: 
(1)  Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones 
has ten coins in his pocket, or 
(2)  Smith is the man who will get the job, and Smith 
has ten coins in his pockets.  
Note that (1) can be taken to paraphrase (3) from Smith's 
perspective (who "...sees the entailment [of (1) from (3)] ... 
and accepts [(1)]..."), and to paraphrase (4) from the 
reader's perspective, but not vice versa. Unlike Smith, the 
reader has the correct information about who will get the 
job, and also knows that Smith has ten coins in his pocket. 
Smith himself clearly does not believe (4) while he seems 
to believe (3).  
So Smith neither has justified true belief in (3) (which is 
false) nor in (4) (which he does not believe). But then, the 
reader rightly wonders, how could he have justified true 
belief in (1)? Thus in the second step the attributive belief 
(2) enters the scene as the third and last possible reading 
of (1) and is then adopted by elimination.  
6.2. The common understanding is that Smith believes 
(2) but does not know (1), the reason for this ignorance 
being that he neither knows about his ten coins nor about 
the job he is about to get. But if Smith actually did believe 
(2), I argued above, none of this need matter for knowl-
edge. But clearly here it does. My conclusion was that 
Smith, for the same reason for which he does not believe 
(4), does not believe (2) either – the coins in his pocket. 
This explains why his ignorance matters, but the counter-
example is dissolved.  
The rationale behind the common reading is somewhat 
twisted, deriving from the overriding desire to attribute 
some belief to Smith, and preferably a justified and true 
one at that. From the possible true beliefs (2) and (4) on 
offer (2) has major advantages over (4). As argued, Smith 
does not have to know that he gets the job to believe (2), 
but he does to believe (4). That by itself would eliminate 
(4). Furthermore (2), unlike (4), is justified by assumption 
(PDJ and existential generalisation5), and the reader thinks 
that clearly it cannot be contradictory to attribute a belief to 
Smith which he is justified to hold. Clearly, if already he is 
justified in believing (2) at the very least he might believe it. 
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 Gettier never says that Smith performs an existential generalisation. The fact 
that he could, and would be justified in so doing, does not suffice to establish 
that he does.  
Nonetheless a contradiction arises from the supposition 
that Smith does believe (2). Thus it is concluded that Smith 
cannot know (1) despite (the possibility of) justified true 
belief in (2). What is more, the ignorance about the coins 
also affects (4) so there is really no reason to believe that 
Smith knows either of these. This conclusion is not 
doubted since anyway expected. 
7. Justified True Beliefs, anyone?  
Smith takes (1) to express (3) and that the reader takes (1) 
to express (2) or (4). Given these beliefs of Smith, for him, 
belief in the truth of (1) and hence its acceptance is 
perfectly legitimate (hence the J: he is 'justified'). So Smith 
accepts the sentence (1) because he believes the 
proposition (3) and believes (1) to express that proposition 
(he mistakenly thinks that the man who will get the job is 
Jones) – he believes (1) to be true. And indeed (1) is true 
(hence the T: his 'belief is true'). Given the beliefs of the 
reader, her acceptance of (1) is equally legitimate. When 
the reader accepts (1) she believes both (2) and (4) which 
she knows to be expressed (ambiguously) by (1) – she has 
better information than Smith about who gets the job 
(required for (4)), and she also knows about the coins in 
Smith's pocket (required for both (4) and (2)). Yet Smith's 
belief (3) is a sufficient reason for his acceptance of (1). It 
is due to rashly identifying this belief in the truth of (1) with 
belief in what (1) expresses that Smith was therefore 
thought to believe (1) too (hence the B: 'belief'), and thus 
(2) (since (3) and (4) are clearly out for him). But accep-
tance clearly is not an infallible guide to belief. It is Smith's 
acceptance of (1) that is mistaken and based on the 
'wrong reasons' (his false belief (3)) – these still help to 
rationalise the problem. But Smith does not have the 
'wrong reasons' for his belief in (1) since he does not 
believe (1) at all, even though he believes (1), the 
sentence, to be true.  
Smith does not have a justified true belief in (1). A fortiori 
he does not have a justified true belief that is not knowl-
edge. Hence Gettier’s first example is flawed.  
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